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THAT T-REX IS MINE! A NOTE ON THE
MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISION
MURRAY v. BEJ MINERALS, LLC
BRYCE HAYDEN
I. Background
What is a mineral? Normally, when minerals come up in conversation,
the average person conjures up colorful rock formations bought at a gift or
pawn shop. Maybe someone in biology would consider minerals to be a
product of the food a person eats for nutritional benefit. However, many
landowners are familiar with mineral interests. These interests generally
include the right to egress and ingress the property and extract oil and
natural gas resources. Generally, all considerations are taken into account
when drafting and negotiating parting the estate's surface and mineral
rights, but what happens when an uncontemplated substance appears and
does not fall in the purview or consideration of that deed? What happens
when sandstone is found and taken from the land? Who would get to
benefit from that resource? The Montana Supreme Court addressed these
differing understandings in Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC.1 The case
presented a legal duel for one of the best Tyrannosaurus-Rex fossils ever

 Bryce Hayden is a current student at the University of Oklahoma, College of Law
and is on track to graduate in May of 2022.
1. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying questions
to 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80.
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found as well as an encapsulated duel between a Ceratopsian and Teropod
that made national headlines.2
As exploration and extraction of minerals of land increased, many
questions on the ownership of these resources came into question. Even in
the twenty-first century, states struggle to allocate resources to the
appropriate owner if they are different and uphold the mineral deed's
interpretation to encompass or exclude the resource. The Montana Supreme
Court has currently set forth a decision impacting Montana’s resource
ownership questions and a decision that could have implications in other
states. The question was whether valuable dinosaur bones belong to a
surface right owner or the mineral right owner. The court created a threefactor test that considers the language of minerals in the deed, consideration
of its rarity and value, and how the substance relates and affects the
surface.3 However, the majority overlooked many considerations of
precedent on the issue and granted the valuable resources to the wrong
person.
This note will present the precedent that led towards the Murray
decisions. It will then explain the underlying facts and procedure to reach
the Montana Supreme Court. Further, it will go into detail about the
majority opinion as well as the dissenting opinion. The article then will
proceed to explain why Montana and other states should consider the fact
comparisons of the dissent more persuasive than the majority, with a
narrowly decided case such as Murray has presented with incredibly high
stakes.
II. Previous Law and Precedent
A. Moving from Texas to Montana: Foundational case in mineral
determination: Heinatz v. Allen4
Heinatz is a case the Montana Supreme Court relies on and is the basis
for the Montana precedent. Land in Travis and Williamson counties in
Texas was owned in whole by the petitioner's mother. 5 The mother
conveyed the mineral rights to the defendant and surface rights to the
2. Will the Public Ever Get to See the “Dueling Dinosaurs”? SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE
(July/August 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/public-ever-seedueling-dinosaurs-180963676/.
3. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying questions
to 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80.
4. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
5. Id. at 995.
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petitioner.6 The defendants then started extracting limestone commercially. 7
Petitioners claimed damages from the extraction of limestone on land in
which they owned only the mineral rights. 8 The court had to determine how
limestone in Texas "relat[es] to the surface of the land, its use and value,
and the method and effect of its removal."9 The opinion focused on how the
stripped or quarried limestone impacted the land. 10 Another comparison is
that limestone is related to gravel or even caliche, which is deposited
similarly to limestone. 11 Using inferences from an assortment of cases,
Texas Supreme Court distinguished sand from other minerals using special
value or rarity, and using it for building purposes does not render it as
valuable. 12
Additionally, there was a question about the limestone's extraction and
how it can affect the value of the land and the surface. Using the Kentucky
case Rudd v. Hayden, the court concluded that the interpretation of what
constituted a mineral hinged on additional words such as cement to add
limestone and other minerals into the word's original meaning. 13 The Texas
Supreme Court concluded and reinforced the notion that limestone is just a
building material similar to sand and has no rare or exceptional value. 14
B. Montana's First Impression: Farley v. Booth Brothers Land & Livestock
Co.
The decision in Farley v. Booth Brothers Land & Livestock Co.
incorporated Heinatz and its reasoning into Montana's precedent. 15 The
defendant owned a ranch subject to multiple agreements from the Western
Energy Company to use the surface of the land for mining purposes. 16 A
plaintiff filed a complaint claiming Western's usage of the surface. 17 The
issue at hand was whether scoria taken from the land should count as a

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id. at 996-97.
Id. at 997.
Id.
Id. at 1000.
270 Mont. 1, 890 P.2d 377 (1995).
Id. at 378.
Id. at 379.
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mineral or subject to the surface. 18 At the time the case was decided, a
legally defined mineral included:
any ore, rock, or substance, other than oil, gas, bentonite, clay,
coal, sand, gravel, phosphate rock, or uranium taken from below
the surface or from the surface of the earth for the purpose of
milling, concentration, refinement, smelting, manufacturing, or
other subsequent use of processing or for stockpiling for future
use, refinement, or smelting.19
A contention that arises later is that the definition of "mineral" can
change due to the context and separate sentences. The court used Hovden v.
Lind to exemplify that when a substance is not exceptionally rare and
valuable, then it does not qualify as a mineral. 20 The court also relied on a
similar case from Oklahoma, which held that normal substances become
minerals if "they are rare and exceptional in character or possess a peculiar
property giving them special value."21 For example, scoria was listed as
ordinary by its use in roadmaking, making it not a mineral. Interestingly,
the court could not determine scoria's alternative use because the lower
court failed to raise the issue, but the court recognized it could change its
determination.22 The court then created its precedent for Montana heavily
relying on the determination of the rarity or special use of the substance in
question. The precedent is:
substances such as sand, gravel and limestone are not minerals
within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word unless they
are rare and exceptional in character or possess a peculiar
property giving them special value, as for example sand that is
valuable for making glass and limestone of such quality that it
may profitably be manufactured into cement. Such substances,
when they are useful only for building and road-making
purposes, are not regarded as minerals in the ordinary and
generally accepted meaning of the word.23

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-303).
Id. at 380 (citing Hovden v. Lind, 301 N.W.2d, 374 (N.D. 1981)).
Id. at 380 (citing Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975)).
Id. at 380-381.
Id. at 380 (1995) (quoting Holland, 540 P.2d at 550-551) (emphasis in original).
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C. Prior Use of the Test: Hart v. Craig
In this dispute, the appellee purchased the land from the appellant in the
late 1980s, with the appellant reserving the mineral rights. 24 The deed listed
normal minerals and additional other minerals in the land. 25 Appellee began
taking and selling sandstone off of the land. The appellant brought suit
claiming that sandstone is a mineral and therefore was part of the
reservation in the conveyance. 26 In addressing this question of gravel, the
Montana Supreme Court followed Farley by ruling that the substance must
be rare and exceptional or used for a specific purpose, such as being refined
or processed. 27 The court deemed sandstone as ordinary and not of high
value because of its use in making everyday items like cement and glass.28
III. Statement of the Case
A. General Facts
Rancher George Severson of Garfield County, Montana, owned the
estate at issue, which is operated as a ranch. 29 The land was leased in 1983
by Mary Ann and Lige Murray (Murrays), who then created a partnership
with Severson to ranch the property. 30 In 2005, the mineral and surface
estate was conveyed and separated. 31 A purchase agreement conveyed the
Murrays to own the entire surface estate and a minority interest in the
mineral estate.32 The direct language of the mineral deed is as follows:
all right title and interest in and to all of the oil, gas,
hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, and that may be
produced from the [property] . . . together with the right, if any,
to ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining,
drilling, exploring, operating, and developing said lands for oil,
gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals, and storing, handling,
transporting, and marketing the same therefrom with the rights to

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Hart v. Craig, 2009 MT 283, 352 Mont. 209, 216 P.3d 197.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198
Id.
Id.
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 81.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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remove from said lands all of the Grantor's property and
improvements. 33
From the available facts, three critical circumstances existed at the time
of the conveyance. The first is that neither party had a suspicion that the
ranch possessed the fossils.34 Second, no party considered the fossils and
their effect after the 2005 transfer of the mineral rights.35 Lastly, there was
no specific intent about who would be entitled to ownership of the fossils. 36
The parties conceded they were of high value and rarity.37 The majority
mineral estate split ownership into thirds between Robert Severson, BEJ
Minerals, LLC, and RTWF LLC, which then were combined to represent
BEJ as a group.38 From 2006 to 2013, the Murrays found the fossilized
remains of a Ceratopsian and Teropod fighting, a Triceratops foot and
skull, and a nearly complete Tyrannosaurus rex.39 The fossils’ were held in
escrow, while their value ranged into the millions of dollars.
B. Procedural Posture
For the sake of clarity, the Montana Supreme Court referred to these
separate proceedings as Murray I and Murray II. The initial suit and
movement for summary judgment served as Murray I. 40 Litigation started in
2013 when BEJ filed for an ownership interest in the fossils as the mineral
owner.41 In the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District Court, the Murrays
sought a declaratory judgment that they own the fossils as the surface right
owners.42 The case was removed to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction; as a result, BEJ sought a declaratory judgment for ownership
of the minerals, and in anticipation, requested records of the fossils and
their accountings. 43
Both parties moved for summary judgment and requested the court to
decide ownership of the fossils.44 The district court reasoned the applicable
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id at 81-82 (bracketing and omission in original).
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81.
Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co. (Murray I), 187 F.Supp.3d 1203, 1207 (2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/5

2021]

A Note on Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC

111

test to use is Farley, but does not set a precedent from the rule in Heinatz.45
In Farley, the court's interpretation used the plain language of the word
mineral and claimed the case at hand was similar to the sandstone to the
fossils found on the property; therefore, the Murrays, as surface right
owners, kept ownership of the fossils. 46
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed Murray I, which then led to its
opinion becoming Murray II. 47 The Ninth Circuit held despite
inconsistencies in the statutory definitions, the statute indicated the fossils
were, in fact, minerals.48 The opinion uses the concession of its monetary
value to satisfy that prong of the analysis on rarity and value. 49 The Ninth
Circuit then en banc certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court to
determine the issue under state law, given Murray I and Murray II for the
fact and procedural background. 50
IV. Majority Opinion's Analysis
The Montana Supreme Court first evaluated the standard of review,
which was abnormal since it was a certifying question from the Ninth
Circuit. When issuing the certifying question, the Montana Supreme Court
received the following certifying question "an interpretation of the law as
applied to the agreed facts underlying the action." 51 With this standard, the
majority addressed the issue provided by the Ninth Circuit, "Whether,
under Montana law, dinosaur fossils constitute 'minerals' for a mineral
reservation."52 The first notion of disagreement stemmed from the
interpretation of the issue from the Ninth Circuit. The majority formulated
the opinion to serve as a benchmark for future decisions by creating clear
precedent on the basis that was the intent of the certifying question by the
Ninth Circuit. 53
The Montana Supreme Court majority first laid out the case law but
faced conflicting problems of the precedents set in both Farley and Hart.
The Montana Supreme Court wrestled with whether Heinatz was binding
45. Id. at 1208.
46. Id. at 1209.
47. Id.
48. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, (Murray II), 908 F.3d 437, 444 (2018).
49. Id. at 447.
50. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1074 (2019).
51. Id. at 83 (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 2009 MT 349, ¶ 4,
353 Mont. 173, 219 P. 3d 1249).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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on the court, which the lower courts had previously established that the
general principles of the case were adopted. 54 The court moved to use
Heinatz but doubled back to prioritizing the ordinary and natural meaning
of the word and the parties' intent otherwise. 55 The court then used language
from Murray I and Heinatz to reshape precedent and make a new rule that
encompasses prior case law.56 First, the court highlights in Murray I, "the
focus of the test articulated by Heinatz does not turn on whether the
substance is 'rare and exceptional in character.'"57 The court built upon this
to determine that a potential mineral's rarity and value is only one factor of
the analysis. 58 Second, the court claimed from Murray I, stating that "a
material's inclusion in the scientific definition of 'mineral' is not
determinative."59 Additionally, there must no showing of an intention to use
in the conveying instrument the scientific definition.60 The court added
from Heinatz a factor that is determined by the substance's effect on the
surface.61
The new test effectively created by the Montana Supreme Court has
three factors that contribute to the designation. The first factor is how the
language of the word "mineral" is used in the deed itself.62 The second
factor pertains to the substance's rarity and value as a critical consideration,
but the court minimized it to a not directly decisive factor. 63 Lastly, the
court looked at the substance's relation to and effect on the surface in its
third factor.64 This last factor is buried in Heinatz as a consideration but
does not carry much weight in Farley and Hart. The court also added
principals from Murray I to help come to the decisions on these factors. The
first is the doubling down that rarity and exceptional in character are only
an equal factor minimized in the case. 65 The court also mentioned that

54. Id.
55. Id. at 84.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F.Supp.3d 1203 (D. Mont.
2016)).
58. Id. at 84.
59. Id. (quoting Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F.Supp.3d 1203 (D. Mont.
2016). See also Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949).
60. See, Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1210; See also Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
61. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 84.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 84.
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scientific definitions of “mineral” were not determinative unless determined
to be so in the parties' intent and the conveying instrument.66
A. The Majority's Determination of the Language of "Mineral" as Used in a
Mineral Deed
The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that the prior litigation
yielded a problem of interpreting and defining "mineral."67 The court
moved to look at "mineral" from the context of an entire sentence rather
than just the word itself. The context of minerals in the deed is as follows:
"oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, and that may be
produced from the [property]."68 These combined with the rights of
"mining, drilling, exploring, operating, and developing said lands for oil,
gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals"69 In also determining "mineral" in this
context was the concept of deeds and contracts being interpreted in the
same manner.70
Indicating the implications of contract law, the court interpreted the deed
at the time of contraction to affect the parties' mutual assent. Additionally,
as required by Montana Statute, when a contract or a deed is reduced to
writing if possible, the court addressed the writing alone to solve any
ambiguity.71 However, because the prior courts of Murray I and Murray II
moved the interpretation outside the document's four corners, the Montana
Supreme Court also elected to do so. 72 Farley's notion of outside resources,
where the court used two different definitions of "mineral" under Montana
statues to determine if scoria meets the definition. 73 The court also noted it
was relying on common sense to determine the intentions in the mineral
deed. 74

66. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019), 464 P.3d 80,
84.
67. Id. at 85.
68. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst.
1971)).
69. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst.
1971).
70. Id. at 85.
71. Mont. Code Ann. § 28-3-303 (West).
72. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 86.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 86 (citing First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862,
869 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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The majority opinion first relied on the interpretation principles noted in
Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co.75 In Carbon County, the parties
conveyed "all coal and coal rights."76 In that case, the Montana Supreme
Court had to determine if the conveyance included coal seam methane
gas.77 After declaring that coal and coal seam methane gas were two
different terms, the court then reasoned expressio unius est exclusion
alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) applies
commonly in Montana.78 The majority then claimed Carbon County was
analogous to Murray because fossils are excluded in the list of "oil, gas,
[and] hydrocarbons."79 Fossils failed to meet the general grant of minerals
because fossils were excluded from the language. 80 Furthermore, the court
noted that fossils were not given specific intent or consideration in the
meaning of "mineral."81
To further the point that mineral and fossils are exclusive terms, the
majority opinion cited multiple statutory definitions found in Montana.
These statutes range in the area the area of law, which the majority points to
Montana's rigorous interpretations as a sign that fossils have never been
contemplated as a mineral. The first statute was the definition for "Metal
Mine Reclamation" and lists many substances and their purposes without
mentioning fossils.82 Second, the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act defined
minerals with a list including gas, oil, sand and gravel, road material, or
other substances.83 Lastly, the majority cites broad tax codes requiring the
taxes owed on minerals, which omits fossils. 84 The majority also cited that
the Murray's did not use the tax code as further evidence. 85
The majority then proceeded to assess the reference of "fossil" under
Montana laws. The term fossil was is in a different title than mineral, under
Title 22: "Libraries, Art, and Antiques." 86 This refers to the preservation of
75. Carbon Cty. v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 271 Mont. 459, 898 P.2d 680, 681-682
(1995).
76. Id. (citing Carbon Cty. v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 271 Mont. 459, 898 P.2d 680,
681-682 (1995)).
77. Id. (citing Carbon Cty., 898 P.2d at 681-82).
78. Id. (citing Carbon Cty., 898 P.2d at 681-82).
79. Id. at 86-87 (citing Carbon Cty., 898 P.2d at 684).
80. Id. at 87.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting MONT CODE ANN. § 82-4-303(16)).
83. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 87 (citing MONT CODE ANN. § 70-9-802(9)).
84. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 87.
85. Id. at 88.
86. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 88 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-3-107).
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fossils and other minerals.87 The majority also mentioned the statutory
reference to the official Montana state fossil in Title 1: "General Laws and
Definitions.”88 Even extending outside of statutory interpretations, the
majority examined the Montana Department of Natural Resources and
Conversation's use of fossil. The use of "fossil" by the department is in
regard to paleontological remains and it uses the same listing format as
those indicating it is expressive and not inclusive of other considerations of
"minerals."89 A further expansion is provided in an excerpt from a 1915
letter from a paleologist to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. 90
After analyzing both sides of "mineral" and "fossil," the majority
explained the relevance pertaining to the case at hand. The statutory
interpretations and use of those statutes' words lend a heavy hand to their
applications' context clues.91 All of the mentioned statutes with the words
were available and constituted a portion of relation to the deed. 92 The
majority categorizes this as "overwhelming authority" that the terms are
exclusive. 93 The deed is restricted to its apparent objects in which the
parties intended to contract.94 The court further stated that this translates to
an intention for fossils not to be a part of the minerals conveyed. 95 The
majority decided to extend that fossils are under the broad reservation of
minerals in the conveyance.96 The parties could have inserted these
considerations and failed to do so, rending the consideration outside the
purview of their intent.97 With these considerations, the factor weighs
towards Murray.
B. Rarity and the price tag of the mineral composition
In the second factor, the court ascertained whether the mineral was rare
and valuable, narrowly only encompassing mineral composition. 98 The
difference is subtle but would impact the decision of the factor
87. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 88.
88. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 88. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-3-107).
89. Id. at 88.
90. Id. at 89.
91. .Id. at 90.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 91 (citing Farley, 270 Mont. at 7-8, 890 P.2d at 380; Hart, ¶¶ 6-7; Heinatz,
217 S.W.2d at 997).
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significantly. The alternative would be that parties need only prove how
valuable and rare the mineral is from a general perspective because fossils
are not found everywhere and command attention and likely would meet
this factor handsomely. 99 The majority declared that to be a unilateral
decision. It would "neglect to thoroughly examine for the ordinary and
natural meaning of mineral by failing to account for the use of the
substance, its relation to the surface, and its method of removal." 100
The main reasoning for its actual narrowing of the rule into the contents
and uses stems from the Heinatz opinion, which states, "In our opinion
substances . . . are not mineral within the ordinary and natural meaning of
the word unless they are rare and exceptional in character or possess a
peculiar property giving them special value."101 The majority stated that it
goes against the ordinary and accepted meaning of "mineral" if aspects like
usefulness or the content of the mineral render it valuable for refinement
and economic exploration.102 However, Heinatz is merely persuasive, but
the court claims this notion is reinforced in Farley and Hart.103 When
determining sandstone, in Hart, the court claimed that " this rock is not very
special, nor is it exceptionally rare and valuable. It does not have to be
changed, refined or processed to be used commercially." 104 The court drew
the comparison from sandstone to fossils because they do not go through
refinement or processing.
The majority attempted to draw a line in the literal meaning of rare and
valuable fossils, but these and others are not rare and valuable in precedent
terms. If the only question asked was in a literal sense of the words "rare"
and "valuable," it would be certain that most fossils would qualify. Fossils
are rare partly due to fossils' exclusivity since they are evidence of
organisms from years ago in a preserved space. These fossils also help
bring understanding to the times before humanity and paint a picture of a
world with different organisms. The court recognized these considerations
but distinguished the meanings of rare and valuable. The majority relied on
the Murray I district court opinion, which stated that not all dinosaur fossils
are considered rare and valuable.105 As a result, the fossils do not meet the

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91 (citing Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hart, ¶ 5) (emphasis omitted).
Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 91 (citing Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1207).
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rare and valuable standard because of their mineral properties.106 The
majority then pulls from the dissenting opinion in Murray II, stating, "value
turns on characteristics other than mineral composition, such as the
completeness of specimen, the species of dinosaur, and how well the fossil
is persevered."107 Another distinction is that fossils are not sourced and
extracted as oil or gas but found by luck and are not valuable because of
their mineral properties.108 On the contrary, the fossils are only valuable
because they are historic.109 The majority concludes since the fossil is not
rare and valuable due to its usefulness and composition, it is not under the
ordinary and natural meaning of the word used in the general mineral
deed. 110
C. How Fossils Relate and Effect the Surface
The court used Heinatz as a comparison to help distinguish if these
"fossils" were "minerals" and how they relate to the surface estate. Another
consideration the Montana Supreme Court implemented was also how the
"mineral" effects the surface in its extraction. Part of the Heinatz analysis
revolves around whether limestone was related to the surface and its effect
on the surface. 111 The Texas Supreme Court held that limestone was related
to the surface because it is "found exposed on the surface" and, in addition,
is generally found on all land at "varying and usually shallow depths." 112 In
the case of limestone, it is "sometimes found on the top of the surface and
removed by quarrying after scraping off the overlying caliche [sic] or other
top soil."113 With this combined, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that
because limestone is exposed near the top of the surface, and so it is part of
the soil itself, it should be considered a part of the surface estate. 114
Concerning how limestone affects the surface, it is destroyed by
quarrying the land. 115 Quarrying found in Heinatz is a process of striping
back land to excavate the limestone, diminishing the agricultural value of
an additional five acres for every acre stripped. 116 The Texas Supreme
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. (citing Murray II, 908 F.3d at 450 (Murguia, J., dissenting)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996.
Id.
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Court held that this destructive manner of excavation was not indicative of
being a part of the surface estate but was helpful in its determination
towards that conclusion. 117
The Montana Supreme Court moved that the non-binding Texas
Supreme Court's analysis of limestone is analogous to fossils related to the
soil. As with limestone sometimes being exposed on the surface, fossils can
be found by surveying the land by driving or walking to look for a sign of a
fossil sticking out.118 Like limestone, the Montana Supreme Court found
that the soil's natural events and erosion could unearth and make fossils
visible from the surface. 119 Therefore, because it is so close to the surface,
the fossils, in this case, bear a strong relation to the surface estate rather
than the mineral estate.120
The Montana Supreme Court also found that the extraction of fossils is
very hard on the surface and affects it significantly, similar to the limestone
in Heinatz.121 Because the extraction is done prudently, and it generally
creates interferences with the use of the surface. 122 Heinatz used the effect
on the surface to help distinguish limestone as a part of the surface estate,
which helped lead the Montana Supreme Court to find the same conclusion.
The majority opinion did recognize that a panel in Murray II viewed "the
quantity, quality, or type of substances present underneath the land may be
unknown."123 Additionally, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged the
panel in Murray II stated that "the purpose of retaining or acquiring a
mineral estate is to extract something valuable from that land."124 However,
the Montana Court did disagree with the second premise due to the surface
estate's effect and that the unknown value proposed does not outweigh this
effect.125 The court also acknowledged that the surface right owners also
acquired that interest to find value and should not be pushed aside by
someone different who owned the mineral rights. 126

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 998.
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 92.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Murray II, 908 F.3d at 447).
Id. (quoting Murray II, 908 F.3d at 447).
Id.
Id.
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V. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Laurie McKinnon agreed with the majority's holding but wrote
separately to distinguish a tool that could have saved the court from
hassling with the dictionary and statutory terms. To reinforce the approach,
Justice McKinnon displayed the disparities using both dictionary and
statutory terms using the finding in Murray I and Murray II. In Justice
McKinnon's example, Murray I held that these definitions "largely
'focus[ed] the mining of hard substances or oil and gas that are primarily
extracted for future refinement and economic purposes.'" 127 This
determination led the court in Murray I to find that fossils are not a part of
the mineral estate because of Heinatz and the guidance of disregarding the
word mineral's technical term. 128 Subsequently, the court in Murray II
"methodically distinguished each statutory, dictionary, and regulatory
definition considered significant to the court in Murray I."129
To further promote that dictionaries are inferior forms of analysis, Justice
McKinnon provides that courts misuse dictionaries. Justice McKinnon
provides that in Murray II, a definition by Murray I was secondary and
provided no foundation for that assertion. 130 A court could conclude that a
dictionary meaning across various sources could provide a different
meaning and does not provide a proper conclusion.131 Finally, before
introducing their solution, Justice McKinnon explained that different
periods of definitions only provide for the meaning during that time that
does not expand to encompass an ordinary meaning. This is illustrated by
Murray II that used BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY and conflated that source to
be a common usage of "mineral."132
In the concurring opinion, Justice McKinnon suggested implementing
"[a]n electronic corpus containing a vast collection of written and spoken
English."133 An electronic corpus is a database that generates the most
common words that are paired around four words or fewer within a mineral
from a vast amount of text.134 These paired words are "collocates" and, if
used with minerals, can assess the word's attested meaning.135
127.
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131.
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Id. at 93 (quoting Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1211).
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93 (citing Murray II, 908 F. 3d at 445, 446 n. 9).
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1281).
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Using "mineral" as the tested word for an electronic corpus, the most
relevant nouns found were "resource," "oil," and "deposit."136 In the case of
verbs found near "mineral" using an electronic corpus was "extract" and
"mine."137 The noun "fossil" was found sixty-nine times compared to the
other listed nouns, which received over 200 results Since the verbs and
nouns conform closer to Murray I characterization of the ordinary meaning,
the concurrence was persuaded with the majority's finding.138 Because
mineral is not found with fossil and cannot be attributed to that definition, it
could not be a part of the mineral estate.
VI. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Ingrid Gustafson, criticized
the majority in the same order as its analysis; therefore, it moved from the
certifying question and then through each factor. The first divergence was
the interpretation of the certifying question by the majority opinion. Justice
Gustafson interpreted the certifying question as being narrower and a factspecific inquiry compared to the broad overarching analysis that Justice
Laurie McKinnon applied in the majority opinion. 139 The dissent cited that
this was a fact-specific situation due to precedent such as Farley and Hart
being fact-intensive opinions. 140 Therefore the dissent phrased the certifying
question as follows, "[w]hether, under Montana law, these dinosaur fossils
constitute 'minerals' for the purpose of a mineral reservation." 141
Justice Gustafson favored the two-prong approach by Montana precedent
of Farley that created the first prong regarding whether the substance
comprised of minerals and secondly whether the substance is rare and
exception or possession a peculiar property giving it value. 142 The two facts
that weighed in BEJ's favor in the analysis of this test would be the parties
did not dispute the mineral composition being 100% of the fossils found
and the undisputed fact they were monetarily valuable. 143 Instead, the
136. Id. at 95.
137. Id. at 95-96.
138. Id. at 96. (The Murray I characterization of plain and ordinary was “the common
understanding of ‘mineral’ includes the mining of a hard compound or oil and gas for
refinement and economic exploration.” Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1212).
139. Id. at 96.
140. Id.
141. Id. (The only difference between the proposed certifying questions would be the
changing of “these” to denote a fact specific inquiry in the dissents proposition).
142. Id. at 97.
143. Id.
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dissent criticized the long search of statues for determining "mineral" in its
first prong by pointing out inconsistencies in its analysis. The first was the
use of MCA § 82-4-303(16) that defines a mineral as "any ore, rock, or
substance . . . that is taken from below the surface or from the surface of the
earth for . . . other subsequent use."144 The fossils met this definition that
the majority cited by being taken from the surface and used subsequently
for scientific research and exhibits. 145 Another relevant statute cited by the
dissent is MCA § 15-38-103(3) that defined "mineral" to be products that
are "nonrenewable merchantable products extracted from the surface or
subsurface of the state of Montana."146 Fossils are not renewable and are
very sought-after products that, in this case, were extracted from the state of
Montana and, according to the dissent, met the definition of the statute. 147
The dissent pointed out that a scientific determination would have been a
better alternative to struggling through statutes that purport many different
meanings.148 The alternative proposed is to shift through statues and
discredit the parties for not expressly indicating dinosaurs' fossils in the
mineral deed. 149 In this case, it was agreed upon that neither party had even
a fleeting thought about fossils being a portion retained or conveyed. 150 The
dissent deemed the majority "whittles its meaning in the deed down to
nothingness by finding the failure to affirmatively, and prospectively, list a
substance which is 100% composed of minerals in a mineral reservation
somehow means that a substance is now a mineral."151
According to Justice Gustafson, the majority created an entirely new test
that stripped away the original test under Hart and Farley.152 The dissent
pointed out that Heinatz and its language being "to the rare and exceptional
qualities of the substance, not its mineral composition." 153 The dissent
points out the disparities in this logic by an analogous example of diamonds
and fossils. 154 Diamonds are made of carbon atoms, which are an abundant
element that is not rare.155 According to the majority's new test, diamonds
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-303(16)).
Id. at 98.
Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-38-103(3).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
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are not rare and valuable because they are composed of carbon, which was
abundant. Fossils would fall under the same logic as they are composed of
"hydroxyapatite and/or francolite, which are not necessarily rare and
valuable on their own."156
The last substantive point the dissent made is its criticism of what the
opinion called "grafting on a third prong."157 The dissent recognized that the
substance's relation to the surface was mentioned in Heinatz but never
adopted in the controlling precedent of Hart and Farley, which only
provided for the two-prong test. Furthermore, Judge Gustafson and the
dissent suggested the need itself to the indicated relation of the surface that
is required in the analysis by the language. “All right title and interest in
and to all of the oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, and
that may be produced from the [property] (emphasis added)." 158 By that
language, the deed demonstrated the parties contemplated the existence of
minerals on the surface and did not need to be examined by the court. 159
VII. Argument in Support of the Dissenting Opinion
Justice Gustafson indicated a problem that will soon arise from the
opinion by stating, "[T]he Court today has upended this simple and clear
guidance. To reach such a result, the Court crafts an new, convoluted, and
opaque three-factor test that will spawn more questions than it answers." 160
The narrow scope of the problem of finding fossils in Montana specifically
is now alleviated due to the Montana Legislature in 2019 passing legislation
that allocated fossils under the surface estate unless clearly and expressly
conveyed in the mineral deed. 161 While it is now statutorily provided in
Montana, that does not alleviate what the majorities new test may do in the
future for other states in which a similar scenario happens with either fossils
or a "mineral" that has not been determined yet. For example, suppose a
state were to have little case law in the area of mineral determination. In
that case, the Murray decisions could lead to this outcome, which has
circumvented the precedent available through Hart and Farley as well as a
foundational case as Heinatz. Because the majority opinion's persuasive
implications are a dual threat to the analysis of not just fossils but other
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100.
Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-112 (formally H.B. 223 referenced in the opinion).
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undetermined minerals on where they belong among the surface or mineral
estate, it is important to criticize the lack of clarity and disregard for
precedent the majority demonstrated.
The majority and dissent are split on the certifying question's scope,
transforming the inquiry from a more fact-specific inquiry or a broad
inquiry. 162 The dissent provided that the certifying question should be
interpreted narrowly. 163 Under Montana law, the Montana Supreme Court
may reformulate the question upon receiving the certifying question. 164 The
majority's broad inquiry argument is stymied because the Montana
legislature already answered the broad question, which leaves a fact
intensive inquiry suggested by the dissent.165 The main determination in
light of MCA § 1-4-112 only leaves the implications, in this case, to follow
precedent and use a fact-specific inquiry.
Following Farley and Hart's precedent, the analysis scientifically is
analogous, which both were found to be minerals, but absent a rare and
exceptional character. Scoria, in the case of Farley, was found to have
100% mineral composition.166 As well as in Hart, the composition of
sandstone was 100%.167 It should have a greater weight ordinarily that
fossils are composed of 100% minerals, such as hydroxylapatite and/or
francolite, in the majority opinion. 168 Regardless, there is a flaw and
uncertainty of looking at the dictionary and statutory definitions. 169 Even
more evident is the concurring opinion, written by Justice McKinnon,
suggesting the use of an electronic corpus that has clear flaws. 170 MCA §
82-4-303(16) provides a clear example of disagreement. 171 The Murrays
proposed this statute as a reinforcement, but the dissent counters that it does
meet that being a substance made of minerals, taken from the surface for
use in exhibits. The majority rebutted this proposition that fossils' mineral
properties do not make them valuable compared to the properties of oil and
gas that makes them valuable. However, the second prong in Farley that
was clear in Heinatz there is a portion to evaluate value and use. The
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 83.
Id. at 97.
M. R. App. P. 15(6)(a)(iii).
Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 96.
Id. at 97 (citing Farley, 270 Mont. at 7-8).
Id. (citing Hart v. Craig, 352 Mont. 209 ¶ 6).
Id. at 98.
See Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437, 442 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 95.
Id. at 98.
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analogy used is diamonds not being valuable because the properties of
diamonds are carbon, which is abundant. 172 It is hard to reconcile that
diamonds are not valuable.
The dissent is persuasive in this fact because it clearly demonstrates that
statues vary in context and change the meaning of what constitutes a
"mineral."173 The capability to determine the composition of a substance
can be distinguished as a mineral that should take a more significant portion
in the ordinary and natural meaning of a mineral. The dissent phrases this
distinction as, "[T]he Court should accept the undisputed fact that these
fossils are scientifically minerals, recognize that the definition of mineral
can differ according to the context in which it is used, and move on to the
second part of Farley test." It is hard to reconcile that because the
distinction was not contemplated in the mineral deed, the ordinary meaning
of minerals and a fossil that had a composition of 100% minerals would not
be in that substance bearing clear statute.
The majority cites the following for their argument that the composition
of a mineral is what is determined as rare and valuable, "In our opinion
substances . . . are not minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of
the word unless they are rare and exceptional character or possess a peculiar
peripety giving them special value."174 The court claimed this speaks to the
resourcefulness demonstrated in Hart because sandstone does not have to
be changed to be used commercially. 175 The dissent continues a functional
analysis of a diamond, rare and valuable outside of its composition of
carbon. There is no indication in Heinatz that mineral composition is what
must be valued monetarily or rare. The explicit language speaks to the
substance. 176 The substance is not to be confused with composition but to
be the fossil itself or, in the dissent's analogy, the diamond itself.
The dissent correctly points out that this expanded reading of Heinatz to
include an effect on the surface factor is not seen in Hart and Farley's
precedent cases. This prong also creates doubt and uncertainty for the
future. Therefore, because it is a factor in the analysis, there must be
thorough discussion and building of case law to establish the depths of the
surface estate and mineral estate, and there they split. 177 Another dimension
to the factor on if the depth is an issue or is it the destruction that the
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 99.
See Farley, 270 Mont. at 6.
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 91.
Id. (citing Hart v. Craig, 352 Mont. 209 ¶ 5).
Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
See Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 100.
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extraction causes that is the determination? 178 This determination was not a
consideration in Montana and now confuses an opinion that was decided to
bring clarity. With all three factors being established, it is clear that the
dissent follows precedent instead of creating a new grafted factored list to
determine minerals in Montana.
VIII. Conclusion
Statutorily it is now a non-issue that fossils are a part of the surface
estate and decided in favor of the Murray's. However, an issue will soon
arise in other states where fossils or other minerals are found. Courts could
incline to use the line of Murray cases to be persuasive in subsequent
outcomes. However, the dissenting opinion should be the most persuasive
as it provides the necessary interpretation consistent in Heinatz, Farley, and
Hart that would have made this analysis logical and linear. Because it
correctly follows precedent and disproves every point, and creates a new
test to stray away from precedent, it is the sound and logical opinion that
should have prevailed.

178. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 100.
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